We show that if policymakers compute the optimal unconstrained interest-rate rule within a Taylor-type class, they may be led to rules that generate indeterminacy and/or instability under learning. This problem is compounded by uncertainty about structural parameters since an optimal rule that is determinate and stable under learning for one calibration may be indeterminate or unstable under learning under a different calibration. We advocate a procedure in which policymakers restrict attention to rules constrained to lie in the determinate learnable region for all plausible calibrations, and that minimize the expected loss, computed using structural parameter priors, subject to this constraint.
Introduction
The development of tractable forward looking models of monetary policy, together with the influential work of Taylor (1993) , has lead to considerable interest in the performance of Taylor-type interest rate rules.
1 These rules take the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument and direct the central bank to set this rate according to a simple dependence on current, lagged or expected inflation and output gap, and possibly on a term generating interest rate smoothing. Extended Taylor-type rules would allow for a dependence on all these variables and also on observable exogenous shocks.
While these simple policy rules have clear advantages, it has been noted by a number of authors, e.g. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) , Woodford (1999) , Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , that the corresponding models exhibit indeterminate steady states for large regions of the reasonable parameter space. This is undesirable because associated with an indeterminate steady state is a continuum of equilibria depending on extraneous variables (or "sunspots"), and the particular equilibrium on which agents ultimately coordinate may be suboptimal. The possibility that monetary policy, by first accommodating sunspots and then subsequently ruling them out, may have played a role in the inflation of the 1970s and the "great moderation" of the late 1980s and beyond, has been argued by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) .
A distinct and equally troubling concern, which can arise whether the steady state is determinate or indeterminate, is the possibility that the choice of interest rate rule results in the intended equilibrium being unstable under least-squares learning by private agents; see Bullard and Mitra (2002) , Bullard and Mitra (2003) , Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) , Evans and Honkapohja (2006) and Evans and McGough (2005b) . In such cases, the economy under learning would fail to deliver the intended equilibrium and might either follow a divergent path or converge to another equilibrium. Also, the issue of whether sunspot solutions can be stable under learning in these models has recently received some attention. 2 1 For a recent survey and extended analysis, see Svensson (2003) . 2 Woodford (1990) demonstrated the possibility of sunspot solutions being stable under learning in simple overlapping generations models. For local stability conditions in purely forward-looking models see Evans and Honkapohja (1994) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) . Evans and McGough (2005c) provide corresponding stability conditions for models with a predetermined variable. For the possibility of stable sunspots in the New
The current paper examines these issues for the New Keynesian model in greater detail. Previous work has shown that indeterminacy and instability under learning can arise for plausible but ad hoc Taylor rules. Here we assess the hazards of indeterminacy and instability under learning when policymakers choose a Taylor-type rule optimally in the sense that they minimize their loss function. One might anticipate that optimized Taylor rules would generate determinate steady states and learnable equilibria, but we show that this is not the case: unstable indeterminacy, stable indeterminacy and unstable determinacy are all possibilities. 3 In assessing optimal policy rules it is thus crucial to explicitly impose both determinacy and stability under learning constraints. 4 We next turn to the issue of parameter uncertainty. Alternative calibrations of the New Keynesian model differ greatly both in terms of the structural parameters controlling the interest elasticity of demand and output elasticity of inflation, and in terms of the degree of inertia. Are optimal constrained policies obtained under one specification robust to alternative calibrations? Our second main conclusion is that parameter uncertainty greatly compounds instability and indeterminacy concerns: a rule that is constrained optimal with respect to one calibration may result in stable sunspots, instability or explosiveness under another calibration. This point holds regardless of the true degree of inertia in the structural model.
To address the additional problems arising from parameter uncertainty, we consider the existence of "robust" policy, in the specific sense of rules that yield stable determinacy across calibrations. Strikingly we find that such rules do exist, and thus we can search for the optimal rule within this class. That is, given a prior distribution over structural parameters, we can use a "model averaging" or "Bayesian" approach to compute the optimal Keynesian Monetary model, see Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005b) . Results on PPP rules in a small open-economy set-up are given in Zanna (2004) .
3 Some partial results along these lines have already been obtained. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) evaluated optimal policy for several classes of Taylor-type rules and found cases in which the optimal rule lay within the indeterminate region. However, they did not investigate stability under learning. Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) , Evans and Honkapohja (2006) showed that some (fundamentals-based) rules designed to be fully optimal can be unstable under learning. Our analysis considers this point more generally and goes beyond these papers in investigating policy across calibrations and in the presence of structural parameter uncertainty.
4 While many numerical optimization routines do check determinacy, standard routines do not verify or impose stability under learning.
interest-rate rule subject to the requirement that it generate determinate stable solutions across all calibrations that obtain with positive probability. The use of model averaging for policy design in the presence of model uncertainty has been advanced by and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) ; the method we employ is essentially theirs, except that in addition our method guards against indeterminacy and instability under learning.
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Our concrete numerical results are easily summarized. We use a prior with subjective weights that reflects the wide diversity of opinion on appropriate parameter values. The robust optimal constrained Taylor-type rule has heavy interest-rate smoothing and places substantial weight on expected future, expected current, and lagged inflation and output, and on observed exogenous shocks. However, we also provide a quite simple robust Taylortype rule, which has only a 1.3% deterioration in performance, and we further find that fairly satisfactory results can even be obtained using simple Taylorrules with interest-rate smoothing and well-chosen coefficients.
Our results are derived within a standard but very simple linearized New Keynesian model. However, our approach has general applicability and could in principle be applied to more detailed and realistic models. The key steps are, first, to obtain the set of policies that are robust in the sense of always yielding a determinate equilibrium that is stable under learning, and then to obtain the policy that maximizes the expected value of the policymaker objective subject to this constraint.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the monetary policy framework and the tools for analyzing determinacy and stability under learning. Section 3 presents the basic issues in the context of Taylor-type rules. Section 4 extends our analysis of optimal constrained policy to allow for parameter uncertainty, and Section 5 concludes.
Framework
We study optimal policy using several variants of the New Keynesian model given by the following forward-looking linearized IS-AS curves:
Here x t is the proportional output gap, π t is inflation rate and i t the nominal interest rate, expressed as the deviation from the steady-state real interest rate (assumed stationary). Also, g t , u t are independent, exogenous zero mean AR(1) shocks with damping parameters 0 ≤ ρ g , ρ u < 1 respectively. As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, we take these shocks to be observable both to private agents and to policymakers. Our assumption that policymakers can observe and condition on exogenous shocks is not innocuous, especially when agents are boundedly rational. Section 4.5 contains more discussion of this issue. The first equation is the forward-looking IS curve obtained from a linearized model of optimizing behavior on the part of consumers. The purely forward-looking case sets δ = 1, whereas setting 0 < δ < 1 allows for an inertial term x t−1 due to habit formation: see for example Smets (2003) . The second equation is the forward-looking Phillips curve. When γ = 1, equation (2) is the pure forward-looking New Keynesian "AS" relationship based on "Calvo pricing," and employed in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Ch. 3 of Woodford (2003) . 6 Here 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor. Again, this equation is obtained as the linearization around a steady state.
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The case 0 < γ < 1 incorporates an inertial term, similar in spirit to Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , the Section 4 model of Gali and Gertler (1999) , and the Ch. 3, Section 3.2 model of Woodford (2003) , each of which allows for some backward looking elements. Models with 0 < γ < 1 are often called "hybrid" models, and some versions, such as Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , set β = 1.
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The structural model is closed by specifying a policy rule describing how interest rates are set. The indeterminacy and instability regions depend 6 For the version with mark-up shocks see Woodford (2003) Chapter 6, Section 4.6. 7 In nonlinear models multiple REE may exist even if the linearized model is locally determinate; see Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) . When nonlinearities are important it may thus be desirable to strengthen the constraints on policy rules that we advocate. 8 To remain consistent with the work of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , when inertia is present we set β = 1. For cases without inertia we use the standard value of β = 0.99.
critically on the specification of this policy rule. We analyze a number of Taylor-type policy rules, which we parameterize as follows:
Earlier work has studied the determinacy and stability properties of these (and related) sets of rules. Here we consider these properties in the context of optimizing policy. Intercepts are omitted for convenience, and in each policy rule π t can be interpreted as the deviation of inflation from its target. We assume throughout that α π , α x ≥ 0 and thus the α π E t π t term, for example, indicates the degree to which monetary policy authorities raise i t in response to an upward deviation of E t π t from its target.
Taylor's original formulation specified dependence on x t and π t , but the assumption that current data on inflation and the output gap are available to policymakers when interest rates are set has been met with criticism: see for example McCallum (1999) . Bullard and Mitra (2002) look at the above alternatives in which the policy instrument i t depends on either expected values of current inflation and the output gap, 9 on their most recent observed values, or on forecasts of their future values. In practice many central banks are believed to use forward-looking decision-making.
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This list is far from exhaustive. It would be natural to include a dependence on observed fundamental shocks and to analyze more general rules that nest (3)-(5) as special cases; in fact, some forms of these more general rules allow for the implementation of the best possible equilibrium as measured by the government's objective. We consider more general rules in Section 4.
The model is said to be determinate if there is a unique nonexplosive REE and indeterminate if there are multiple nonexplosive solutions. 11 The 9 The time t expectations of (t + s)-dated endogenous variables (s = 0, 1) are assumed conditioned on t-dated exogenous variables, and all (t − 1)-dated information.
10 To simplify our analysis under learning we assume that central bank and private sector expectations are identical, either because they use the same learning scheme or because one group relies on the others' forecasts. For further discussion, see Bullard and Mitra (2002) , Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) , Evans and McGough (2005b) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) .
11 By "nonexplosive" we mean that for each t the conditional expectations E t |x t+s | and E t |π t+s | are uniformly bounded over s. For a detailed discussion of this and related concepts see Evans and McGough (2005c) . determinacy of a model can be analyzed by writing the reduced form equation as a difference equation with the associated extraneous noise terms capturing the errors in the agents' forecasts of the free variables. If the nonexplosive requirement of a rational expectations equilibrium pins down the forecast errors, that is, if the dimension of the unstable manifold is equal to the number of free variables, then the model is determinate. The methodology for assessing determinacy in linearized models is well known, and we refrain from presenting the details. For the models considered here, specifics are given in our earlier paper Evans and McGough (2005b) .
If the model is indeterminate, there exist multiple stationary solutions, including those that depend on extrinsic fluctuations or "sunspots" as well as solutions that "over-react" to intrinsic shocks. Furthermore, a given sunspot solution has alternative representations, a point that is important if one is interested in whether sunspot solutions are stable under learning. Again, these issues are discussed at length in Evans and McGough (2005b) .
We now discuss the issue of stability under learning. If the model is determinate, so that there is a unique non-explosive REE (rational expectations equilibrium), it is desirable that the solution be stable under learning. By this we mean that there is convergence to the solution if private agents in the economy estimate and update the coefficients of their forecast functions using least squares regressions. Because the models are self-referential, i.e. the evolution of the economy depends on how agents form expectations, the stability of an REE under least squares learning cannot be taken for granted.
More specifically, the structural model combined with the interest rate rule can be written in reduced form as follows:
where
. We now write E * t to indicate that we no longer impose rational expectations. Thus we are treating the IS and AS equations (1)- (2) as arising from the aggregation of individual decisions, which depend on expected and lagged output and inflation.
12 At issue is how agents form their time t expectations E * t . In the determinate case the unique nonexplosive solution takes the form y t =ā +by t−1 +cĝ t ,
for particular valuesā,b andc. Under least squares learning, y t = a + by t−1 + cĝ t + ε t is treated as the (reduced form) econometric specification of a forecasting rule, the parameters of which are estimated by the private agents; policymakers are assumed to use the same forecasts as the private sector. Here ε t is a white noise disturbance believed by agents to be present. The specification is often referred to as a Perceived Law of Motion (PLM). Combining the regressors into the vector X 0 t = (1, y 0 t−1 ,ĝ 0 t ) and writing the parameters as Θ 0 = (a, b, c), the PLM can be written as y t = Θ 0 X t . Under learning agents obtain least squares estimates Θ 0 t = (a t , b t , c t ) using data through time t and then use the estimated PLM to form their forecasts E * t y t+1 and E * t y t , which in turn influence the path of y t . The question is then whether or not (a t , b t , c t ) → (ā,b,c) as t → ∞. If so, we say that the solution is stable under learning.
We use expectational stability (E-stability) as our criterion for judging whether agents are able to coordinate on specific solutions (including sunspot equilibria in which the solution also depends on an exogenous sunspot process). This is because, for a wide range of models and solutions, E-stability has been shown to govern the local stability of REE under least squares learning. In many cases this correspondence can be proved, and in cases where this cannot be formally demonstrated the "E-stability principle" has been validated through simulations. For a thorough discussion of E-stability see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) .
The E-stability technique is based on a mapping from the PLM to the corresponding Actual Law of Motion (ALM) parameters. For the case at hand, if agents believe in the PLM (a, b, c) then their corresponding forecasts are given by E * t y t+1 = a + bE * t y t + cE * tĝ t+1 . Let ρ denote the 2 × 2 diagonal matrix with elements ρ g , ρ u . Using E * t y t = a + by t−1 + cĝ t , and assuming for convenience that ρ is known, so that E * tĝ t+1 = ρĝ t , yields
Inserting E * t y t and E * t y t+1 into (6) and solving for y t as a linear function of an intercept, y t−1 andĝ t yields the corresponding ALM parameters induced by the PLM. In this way, a mapping is defined from PLM parameters Θ to the ALM parameters T (Θ):
The REEΘ 0 = (ā,b,c) is a fixed point of this map and is said to be E-stable if it is locally asymptotically stable under the differential equation
The E-stability principle tells us that E-stable representations are locally learnable for least squares and closely related algorithms. That is, if Θ t is the time t estimate of the coefficient vector Θ, and if Θ t is updated over time using recursive least squares, thenΘ is a possible convergence point, i.e. locally Θ t →Θ, if and only ifΘ is E-stable. Computing E-stability conditions is often straightforward, involving computation of eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrices of (11). Determinacy and stability under learning are both clearly desirable properties for a policy rule. If a policy rule yields indeterminacy then in addition to the intended REE there exist other solutions depending on sunspot variables that may be substantially inferior, in terms of the policymaker objective function. If the policy rule yields determinacy but is unstable under learning, then the economy will fail to converge to the intended solution. The earlier literature has shown that these are independent properties and so both must be checked.
A further issue of interest is whether, in the case of indeterminacy, sunspot solutions are stable under learning. Recent research has found that sunspot solutions can in some cases be stable under learning in monetary models of the type considered here, and that stability can depend on the particular representation of the solution that forms the basis of the agents' PLM. We regard an equilibrium as learnable (or stable) if it is E-stable for at least one representation. The representations used for our stability analysis are discussed in detail in Evans and McGough (2005b) .
Above we stated that the model is closed with an instrument rule for the interest rate. However, we can treat the parameters of the policy rule as assessed, or pinned down, by imposing optimizing behavior on the part of the government. As is common in the literature, we assume, for the government's criterion, a loss function that is quadratic in π and x.
13 The government chooses its policy parameters to minimize this criterion subject to the structural model of the economy. For example, suppose the government faces the problem min
where equations (1) and (2) hold and the interest rate is determined by, say, (3), (4) or (5). ψ is the relative weight assigned to the variance of the output gap, and V ar(·|α) is the unconditional variance of "·" given the policy parameters. Here the government has only two choice variables, α x and α π , but for the more general rules considered below this number may increase to nine. An interest rate variance term is sometimes included in the loss function (12). This is omitted in our formulation in part for simplicity, but also because neither its inclusion nor its specific form are widely agreed upon. The value of the government's objective can be computed by determining the rational expectations equilibrium associated with the relevant policy parameters α. In the indeterminate case, this value is not well defined due to the presence of multiple equilibria. For the analysis in this paper we examine the "minimal state variable" (MSV) solution, i.e. a solution of the form (7), and if there are multiple such solutions, we take the loss to equal the minimum across solutions of this form.
14 We make this choice because MSV solutions are the ones normally computed in optimal policy exercises and because policymakers are aiming to minimize expected loss. mizing the government's loss function can lead to indeterminacy, instability, or even the presence of stable sunspots. Here, and throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the terms "stability" and "instability" to refer to stability under least squares learning, as discussed above. 16 We will find that for forward-looking specifications of the model, all of these outcomes can indeed arise. We conclude that it is essential that the optimal policy problem be explicitly constrained to deliver both stability under learning and determinacy.
Analytic results are not tractable and so we proceed numerically. For each policy rule of the form (3)- (5) we examine three different calibrations of the IS-AS parameters, due to Woodford (1999) , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , and McCallum and Nelson (1999) , as well as a fourth "variant" calibration given by the largest values of φ and λ across the three calibrations. The relevant parameter values are given in Table 1 . 17 In all cases we set ρ g = ρ u = .9, and the conditional variances of g and u each at 0.1. In this Section we mainly focus on purely forward-looking specifications in which β = .99 and δ = γ = 1. For each policy rule and calibration, and for policy objective function weights ψ ∈ {.1, 1, 10}, a lattice was analyzed in the region of policy space given by 0 ≤ α x , α π ≤ᾱ. We setᾱ = 5 and increasedᾱ if the minimum loss occurred on the boundary. The stability and determinacy properties of the model corresponding to each lattice point were computed, using the numerical procedures described in Evans and McGough (2005b) , and the value of the government's objective function (expected loss) was determined as in Appendix B of Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) . These values were then used to numerically compute contours, and hence a graphical representation of the government's indifference curves was obtained. Finally, a numerical optimization algorithm was used to compute the optimal policy parameters within the specifiedᾱ ×ᾱ benchmark policy space.
Main Results
Our numerical results for the purely forward-looking model demonstrate that unconstrained optimal policy can indeed yield indeterminate or unstable solutions as well as determinate stable solutions. Not only do regions of unstable indeterminacy, unstable determinacy or stable indeterminacy exist, but unconstrained optimization algorithms may seek them out; against this possibility policymakers must stand guard.
As an example, consider the Woodford calibration with policy weight ψ = 0.1. Under the lagged data Taylor rule the loss minimizing choice of parameters places the economy in the unstable indeterminate region, while under the forward expectations rule unconstrained optimization leads to stable indeterminacy. Figure 1 illustrates the latter case. Note that the optimum is on the boundary of the policy parameter space considered. Only the contemporaneous policy rule is immune to the problems of sometimes choosing policy weights yielding solutions that are either indeterminate or unstable under learning or both. However, a contemporaneous policy rule does not always minimize the loss function, so it would be unwise to restrict policy to this class. For example, for the McCallum-Nelson calibration, and ψ not too large, the lagged data rule is superior to the contemporaneous rule.
Can instability or indeterminacy arise if policymakers optimize across all three classes of rules as well as within each class? Optimizing across rules would not necessarily avoid the difficulties we have identified. For example, in the variant calibration with ψ = 1, the optimal rule, which takes the lagged data form, leads to unstable indeterminacy. Furthermore, in a substantial number of cases, two different policy rules lead to the same optimal objective value, but with only one of the rules yielding stable determinacy. For both the Woodford and Clarida-Gali-Gertler calibrations, with at least some policy weights ψ, the contemporaneous rule and the forward expectations rule both achieve the optimum, but with the latter rule yielding stable indeterminacy.
Further Discussion
In many cases there is a tendency for the government's objective function to be very flat near the optimum. Flatness can make it difficult to pin down numerically an appropriate optimal rule. Consider, for example, the Woodford calibration with policy weight ψ = 0.1, illustrated in Figure 1 , with the forward-looking policy rule. The objective function is nearly flat for a non-empty sub-region of the benchmark space, and perhaps even constant along a positively sloped line. Figure 3 plots the value of the government's objective along the line α x = 0.433α π − 0.365, as α π varies from 1 to 5. A dashed line indicates that the corresponding equilibrium is stable, determinate, while a solid line indicates stable, indeterminate. The government's objective is almost constant across these parameters.
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Figure 3 about here However, an important implication of these results is that imposing determinacy and stability requirements in the policy optimization problem can in some cases have a small cost in terms of the policy objectives.
The problems we have identified are most acute in purely forward-looking specifications of the IS and AS relations. We also considered inertial specifications with β = 1 and δ = γ = .5, which is broadly consistent with Smets (2003) . For this specification the results from the forward-looking model are greatly mitigated: optimal policy results in stable determinacy for all calibrations except the variant (which can still yield stable or unstable indeterminacy). However, low levels of inertia yield results similar to those obtained in the purely forward-looking case.
The possibility of optimizing methods leading to indeterminate or unstable equilibria depends on the calibration. The McCallum-Nelson calibration always delivered stable determinacy for the optimal policy parameters with all three versions of the policy rule and all three policy weights ψ, whereas the Woodford and the variant calibrations are particularly susceptible to problems. This finding, and those just mentioned for models with inertia, appears to be a reflection of the greater importance of feedback from expectations when the interest-elasticity of output is large.
Problems of indeterminacy and/or instability arise even for fully optimal rules. That rules consistent with optimal policy can be unstable under learning was shown in Evans and Honkapohja (2003c) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) . We discuss this issue fully in our companion paper Evans and McGough (2005a) , in which we the obtain the "optimal policy manifold" within the class i t = α f E t y t+1 + α L y t−1 + αĝĝ t , and show that a large part of this manifold corresponds to rules that are unstable and/or indeterminate. Unconstrained optimizers are therefore subject to these hazards, both for simple Taylor rules and for fully optimal rules.
Robust Optimal Constrained Policy
We are now in a position to set out our recommended procedure for choosing the policy rule. First, we constrain our policy rules to yield stable, determinate equilibria. When there is uncertainty about structural parameters, we require policy to be robust in the specific sense of being stable, determinate across calibrations. Secondly, we maximize the expected value of the objective across rules constrained to lie in this set. We begin this section by considering the implications of model uncertainty.
The Dangers of Model Uncertainty
When we allow for model uncertainty, the potential hazards of indeterminacy and instability under learning become even more acute. Our second main result is that a policy that is chosen as constrained optimal (i.e. constrained to yield stable determinacy) for a given calibration, can be unstable, indeterminate or explosive, under alternate calibrations. 20 To examine this we considered eight possible states of the world, given by the four calibrations in Table 1 , and either the purely forward-looking (δ = γ = 1 and β = 0.99) or "lag" specifications (δ = γ = 0.5 and β = 1) of the structural model, combined with either the lagged-data or forward-looking Taylor rule. 21 The policy weight is set at ψ = 1.
For the optimized lagged-data Taylor-rule, if the perceived structural model of the policymaker is the purely forward-looking Woodford calibration, but the true model is any of the other seven models, unstable indeterminacy will result. If the perceived model is either the purely-forwardlooking or lagged McCallum-Nelson calibration and the true model is any of the other six models, the resulting equilibrium is explosive. 22 For the optimized forward-looking Taylor rule, both perceived purely forward-looking and lagged versions of the Clarida-Gali-Gertler and McCallum-Nelson calibrations (and the purely forward-looking Woodford calibration) lead to stable indeterminacy under at least one of the other calibrations.
These problems did not arise for the contemporaneous rule (3). Why is the contemporaneous rule immune to these problems? Indeterminacy, instability or explosive equilibria tend to arise when there is too much feedback from future expectations or lagged endogenous variables, while negative feedback from contemporaneous expectations tends to enhance stability and determinacy. These factors thus tend to favor the contemporaneous rule. However, rules restricted to the class (3) will in general be inferior, in terms of the policymaker objective, to more general rules, as we will see below.
Robust Optimal Constrained Policy
The results just given, together with the range of estimates of structural parameters available in the literature, indicate the need for a policy that is robust to model uncertainty. The method of robust analysis we describe is a "model averaging" or Bayesian technique, similar in spirit, to the procedures used by and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) . Put simply, we have policymakers assign a distribution over possible models and the policymaker's objective may then be computed as the expected value of the objective conditional on this "prior" distribution. However, we now add the constraint that policy be determinate and stable under learning for all parameter values that have positive probability. 23 We call the policymaker 21 Similar results arise for rules of the form i t = α f E t y t+1 + α L y t−1 + αĝĝ t . 22 The possibility of model misspecification leading to explosive paths was pointed out in . 23 Batini, Justiniano, Levine, and Pearlman (2004) also impose determinacy requirements in their study of inflation-forecast-based rules. However, they do not address the probability distribution over models their "prior" in order to emphasize that it gives their subjective weights concerning the validity of the different models. However, these weights should also reflect the likelihood of the observed data for each model, i.e., the goodness of fit across models, and thus might more appropriately be called the "posterior " distribution or "updated prior. " Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004) discuss this issue in detail. 24 Formally, we consider a set of structural model parameters S and assume that we have a probability distribution over their possible values with support S ⊂ S. We examine a specified class of interest-rate rules parameterized by ξ ∈ X and determine the set P ⊂ X defined by P = © ξ ∈ X : determinacy and learning stability hold for all ω ∈S ª .
Given a policy loss function L(ξ, ω) that is well-defined for all ξ ∈ P and ω ∈S, and assuming that P is non-empty, the robust optimal constrained policy is defined byξ = arg min
where the expectation is taken over the prior distribution onS. We illustrate how this method can be implemented by assigning probabilities to the various calibrations, parameterized by the key parameters ω = (φ, λ, γ, δ). Thus we allow for uncertainty with respect to both the structural parameters and the degree of inertia. For the structural parameters φ, λ we set the conditional probability weights at 0.3 for the three main calibrations given in Table 1 and at 0.1 for the variant calibration. For the (independently distributed) inertial parameters γ, δ we set the conditional probability weights at 0.4 for γ = δ = 0.5, at 0.2 each for γ = δ = 0.75 and γ = δ = 0.25, and at 0.1 each for γ = δ = 1 and γ = δ = 0.01.
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issue of stability under learning.
24 See Cogley and Sargent (2005) for an interpretation of the post WWII history of monetary policy as a response to changing priors on the validity of competing models. 25 There is sharp disagreement on the extent of inertia in the economy. For example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) employ a set-up that is fully inertial, while Smets (2003) estimates the degree of inertia at one-half and Milani (2004) provides evidence that apparent persistence may be due to adaptive learning in a fully forward-looking model.
Robust Taylor Rules
We begin by considering robust Taylor rules, with the additional possibility of including an interest rate smoothing term parameterized by θ. Thus the contemporaneous rule with smoothing takes the form
and the lagged-data and forward-looking rule are modified accordingly. In terms of the definition of robust optimal constrained policy just given, for these policy rule classes we are setting ξ = (α π , α x , θ). It is straightforward to verify numerically that for the contemporaneous and forward-looking rules there is a policy ξ such that the associated model is stable determinate for all calibrations and all inertial specifications on which the prior places positive weight. Thus the constraint set P of our optimization problem is non-empty for both of these classes of rules. On the other hand the lagged-data rule does not deliver feasible robust policies, i.e. for this class of rules P is empty. Using Matlab to perform the optimization subject to stability, determinacy, and α x , α π ∈ [0, 5], θ ∈ [0, 2], we obtain the results presented in Table  2 , corresponding to ψ = 1. For the contemporaneous rule without smoothing α π lies on the boundary. When the smoothing term θ is set equal to zero the contemporaneous rule performs much better than the forward-looking Taylor-rule. This reflects the prevalence of indeterminacy when policy rules depend on forward expectations. However, inclusion of the interest-rate smoothing term θ > 0 significantly mitigates this effect. The expected loss is much higher than seen in Figures 1 and 2 , reflecting the much smaller extent of control available to policymakers when economic outcomes are more heavily determined by lagged inflation and output than by expected future conditions. We remark that in evaluating policy we continue to use the policy loss function (12). In New Keynesian models with inertia, the expected utility of the representative agent would dictate different forms of objective function, with the precise form depending on the source of inertia. This raises deep issues, since in principle the appropriate policy objective would depend on whether inertia is present and on the reason for inertia. By using (12) to evaluate results across models we side-step this issue, but in a way that seems realistic from the viewpoint of practical policy-making.
Robust Extended Taylor-type Rules
Our methods can be employed to examine extended Taylor-type rules. If policymakers can observe fundamental shocks, and if these shocks contain information orthogonal to that provided by the endogenous variables, then optimal policy will depend on them. Furthermore, in purely forward looking models, optimal policy with commitment will depend on the lagged state. We thus consider the class of interest-rate rules
For this exercise, we again set ψ = 1. Table 3 reports two policy rules. The first row imposes that policy parameters lie in the range α x , α π ∈ [−5, 5], θ ∈ [0, 2], which turns out to be a constraint for α c x . The second row gives the results for expanding the box for α x , α π to [−100, 100] . This provides some limited improvement in the expected loss function, consistent with our previous findings that the objective function is quite flat near the optimal policy. As with the robust Taylor rules, the smoothing parameter θ is chosen to be large. Here θ is slightly larger than one (giving "superinertial" rules). A strong smoothing term appears indicated when parameter uncertainty is present.
A Simple Nearly Optimal Rule
Given the flatness of the objective function, it is of interest to ask whether simpler rules can be devised that meet our requirements that the rule be determinate and stable across all specifications that receive positive weight in the prior, and which come close, in terms of minimizing the expected loss function, to the performance of the optimal rule just computed. A search across simpler rules yields the following specification:
This interest-rate rule is stable and determinate for all calibrations and inertial specifications with positive prior probability, and yields an objective value of 132.22, which represents slightly less than a 1.3% increase over the expected loss achieved by the optimal rule.
The rule (15) is easily interpretable, taking an "integral" form in which interest rates are increased in response to higher levels of the expected future inflation rate and its increase relative to last period's inflation rate, to the expected current output gap and its increase relative to last period's output gap, and to observed exogenous inflation shocks. Remarkably, even simpler rules lead to only modest reductions in performance. Returning to simple Taylor rules with smoothing of the form (13), given earlier, we see that specification α x = 1.76, α π = 3.02, and θ = 0.88 leads to an objective value of 140.83, which is an additional 6.5% loss over that achieved by (15).
Our robust extended Taylor-type rules condition on exogenous shocks; however, this raises the important issue of whether these shocks can realistically be taken as observable. In New Keynesian models the IS shock, which we denote g t , is typically generated by government spending, taste and productivity shocks. While government spending may be observable, other disturbances might be better modeled as unobserved by the policymaker. A similar issue arises with respect to the disturbance in the AS relation. In the current set-up, if the exogenous variables are not observed by the Central Bank, simple robust rules not conditioning on them are still available: for example, if, in (15), the u t term is omitted and the coefficient on E t x t changed to 0.5 then the expected loss 137.96. In future work we intend to address the issue of observability by incorporating into our model both observed and unobserved shocks.
Discussion
Given the wide range in the literature for structural parameter and inertial calibrations of New Keynesian models, a variety of calibrations should be considered when searching for a good policy rule. To simultaneously consider multiple calibrations, we employed a simple "Bayesian" procedure, weighting each calibration according to a specified prior probability. We then computed, within a given class of rules, the optimal policy parameters subject to the constraint that the economy be stable under learning and determinate for all calibrations with positive probability.
An important finding of this exercise is that the constraint set is not empty, despite allowing for a very wide range of calibrations that received positive weight. This suggests that our procedure may provide a feasible and fruitful way to think about the optimal choice of interest-rate rules in serious applied models, while imposing determinacy and stability constraints and allowing for structural parameter uncertainty.
We also found that a relatively simple rule, specifically (15), is capable of simultaneously yielding stability and determinacy, as well as producing an objective value within 1.3% of the optimum. Admittedly, we have only considered a range of simple, stylized models. These results, however, suggest that the technique advanced above may provide similarly simple nearly optimal robust rules in more general and more realistic modeling environments.
26
A number of extensions of our analysis would be useful. Modeling structural uncertainty could be extended to continuous distributions of parameters, such as those used in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2003) . Second, as mentioned previously, both observed and unobserved exogenous shocks could be incorporated. Third, hidden states and doubts about the prior and/or likelihood could be introduced as in Hansen and Sargent (2005a) , Hansen and Sargent (2005b) . Fourth, the objective 26 We emphasize that our policies are robust in a very specific sense. We do not consider unstructured model uncertainty in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2003) , robust optimality to exogenous disturbances in the sense of Giannoni and Woodford (2002) , or robustness to qualitatively different structural models, as in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) . Furthermore, our learnability constraint concerns local stability under learning under a fixed structure. Other relevant concerns are maximizing the basin of attraction for least-squares learning, discussed in Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2005) , and policy choice with structural shifts and perpetual learning, e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2004) . Many of these approaches are complementary in the sense that they could be combined with our analysis. function (12) could be replaced by conditional expected discounted quadratic loss, and the impact of transitional learning dynamics included as in Ferrero (2005) .
We conclude this Section by noting that the existence of a non-empty constraint set P is a requirement that may not be met in future applications of the technique and thus warrants further discussion. Although various modifications would be possible, our preference would be to extend the procedure in the following way. Given 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, let P (η) denote the set
(determinacy and stability under learning) ≥ 1 − η ¾ , and letη be the smallest value for which P (η) is nonempty. For any given η ≥η the robust optimal constrained policyξ(η) would then be defined bȳ
whereẼ denotes expectation now computed conditional on parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate and stable. We think of η as a parameter chosen by policymakers and representing the largest acceptable probability that the assessed constrained optimal policy will yield an outcome that is not stable, determinate. Policymakers could then either specify a sufficiently low value for η ≥η that they consider acceptable, or be presented with the trade-off between η and min ξ∈P (η)Ẽ L(ξ, ω). Indeed, even in the case found here in whichη = 0, one could examine the potential gains, in terms of reduced expected loss, from permitting η > 0. We refrain from presenting these results on the assumption that policymakers would prefer to be maximally robust.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated the potential for policymakers, attempting to choose the optimal rule within a class, to be directed towards rules that lie in the indeterminacy and/or learning instability regions. Taylor-type rules have an appealing simplicity, with the key inflation and output coefficients traditionally chosen based on plausible rules of thumb. One might expect that improved performance would be obtained by choosing these policy parameters optimally for a given calibrated model. Paradoxically this may not be the case, because searching for the optimal policy rule within a given class may fail to deliver a rule that produces a determinate equilibrium that is stable under learning. It is therefore imperative that the search for optimal policy rules be constrained to the determinate stable region. Considering a class of extended Taylor rules sufficiently general that it includes fully optimal solutions does not avoid this problem since it will contain some "fully optimal" rules that are subject to indeterminacy and/or instability problems.
These problems are compounded by structural parameter uncertainty. Policy rules that lead to determinacy and stability under learning and that are fully optimal for one set of structural parameters can lead to indeterminacy, instability or even explosiveness, for another set of parameters. We therefore advocate a "robust" optimization procedure, in which policymakers select the optimal constrained rule. Such a rule is computed as the one which minimizes the policymaker's expected loss, based on prior probabilities for the structural parameters, but which is constrained to satisfy the condition that it lies within the region of stable determinacy for every calibration that has positive probability.
Our key points about the hazards of an unconstrained search for optimal policy have been developed in the context of the basic New Keynesian framework and hybrid versions incorporating inertia, and we have used this framework to show how to compute the robust optimal constrained interestrate rule. However, the approach is quite general and could be applied to more elaborate structural macroeconometric models. 
